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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, Crystal Lee Gabel was found guilty of one count of possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.
On appeal, Ms. Gabel contends that the State engaged in two instances of
misconduct during her second trial, which both occurred during closing statements. The
prosecutor erroneously informed the jury as to one of the elements of the charge, and
improperly offered her own opinion on Ms. Gabel's veracity. Although the prosecutorial
misconduct was not objected to, Ms. Gabel asserts that it amounted to fundamental
error and therefore can be considered on appeal. The misconduct violated Ms. Gabel's
right to a fair trial and due process.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In the early morning hours of August 16, 2012, Officer Santino Yago saw
someone throw a cigarette butt out of the passenger side of a minivan. (12/10/13 Trial
Tr., p.21, L.19 - p.22, L.4.) Officer Yago pulled the driver over, and asked the driver for
permission to search the vehicle. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.22, Ls.2-7, p.25, Ls.15-19.) The
driver agreed to the search, and each of the three passengers exited the van, one by
one. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.24, L.14 - p.25, L.8, p.25, Ls.18-21.) Ms. Gabel, one of the
passengers, was the fourth and final person to exit the van, and after she exited, Officer
Yago noticed a small plastic baggie containing a crystal substance which later tested
positive for methamphetamine.

(12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.25, Ls.1-9, p.26, Ls.5-13, p.27,

Ls.2-6, p.41, Ls.4-10.) Officer Yago questioned the occupants of the vehicle, focusing
his efforts on Ms. Gabel, as she had been sitting in the location where the
methamphetamine was found. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.26, Ls.5-8, p.32, L.11 - p.33, L.15.)
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Ms. Gabel told two different stories about how and when she came to be holding the
methamphetamine.

(12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.2, p.33, Ls.16-23, p.35,

Ls.6-23.) After being told by Officer Yago that her boyfriend, passenger Richard Bower,
had told Officer Yago that he had given it to Ms. Gabel to hold, Ms. Gabel admitted that
this was true. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.2.) When she savv ~Jlr. Bower
being detained for possessing the controiled substance, Ms. Gabel changed her story
and told the officer that she got the baggie from some girls at a party. (12/10/13 Trial
Tr., p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.32.) Ms. Gabel also told Officer Yago that she had last used
methamphetamine four hours earlier. (12/10/13 Trial Tr., p.34, Ls.5-13.)
Based en these facts, Ms. Gabel was charged by Information with one count of
felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.

(R, pp.24-25.)

Ms. Gabel exercised her constitutional right to a jury trial. The first trial resulted in a
hung jury. (11/13/13 Trial Tr., p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.3.) The second time the case was
tried, the prosecutor erroneously told the jury during her closing statement that it had to
decide two issues, one of which was whether Ms. Gabel "knew or should have known
that what was in that baggie was methamphetarnine." (12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.24, Ls.1114 (emphasis added).)

The prosecutor also inserted her own opinion when she

commented on Ms. Gabel's veracity during her closing remarks.

(12/11/13 Trial

Tr., p.25, L.22 - p.26, L.2, p.27, Ls.15-21.) The jury in the second trial ultimately found
Ms. Gabel guilty as charged. (12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.45, Ls.7-15.)
On February 25, 2014, the district court sentenced Ms. Gabel to three years,
with one and a half years fixed, and suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Gabel on
probation for three years.

(R., pp.115-117.)

The district court entered a written

Judgment of Conviction on March 11, 2014. (R., pp.120-122.)
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On March 17, 2014, Ms. Gabel timely appealed the Judgment of Conviction.
(R., pp.123-'126.)
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ISSUE
Did the State engage in one or more instances of misconduct, such that Ms. Gabel is
entitled to a new trial?

4

ARGUMENT
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial
Ms. Gabel asserts that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and the
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor:

(1) misrepresented the law

during closing arguments; and (2) offered her own opinion on Ms. Gabel's purported
untruthfulness and her guilt/innocence.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[e]very person accused of crime in
Idaho has the right to a fair and impartial trial."

Cl 980).

State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504

Further, the prosecutor has an independent duty to the defendant with regard to

his or her right to a fair trial. In the words of the Court:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to
the jury." They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing
they transgress upon the rights of the accused."

State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
Ms. Gabel asserts that the prosecutor's misconduct usurped the jury's factfinding
role, lowered the State's burden of proof, and amounted to fundamental error, and,
therefore this Court should vacate her conviction for possession of a controlled
substance.
A.

The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments By
Misstating The Law
Ms. Gabel asserts that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during

her closing argument by misstating the law.

The misstatement of the law ultimately

reduced the State's burden of proof, allowing the jury to convict Ms. Gabel using a
negligence standard.
5

Ms. Gabel was charged with possession of a controlled substance under
LC.§ 37-2732(c)(1) which provides, in relevant part:
(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless
the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
(1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a
controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a
controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a fe!ony and upon
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined
not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
1.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ).

Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime requiring that the
defendant knowingly possess the substance.

State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704

(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,
926 ( 1993 ).

The Idaho Court of Appeals in Stefani noted that, "[t)he purpose of the

intent element in the definition of a possession offense is to separate innocent,
accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal behavior." 1 Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704.
Here, the State charged Ms. Gabel with possessing methamphetamine in
violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1 ). (R., pp.24-25.) The general elements
jury instruction provides that "[i]n order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a
Controlled Substance, the state must prove each of the following: ... the defendant
either knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance." (Jury
Instruction No. 11, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on December 19, 2014.)
Therefore, it was the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Gabel
knew it was methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance.
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Under this

instruction, the jury could not convict if she did not know it was meth or some other
controlled substance-even if the jurors believed she should have know it was meth or
some other controlled substance.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor began her closing statement to the jury by saying:
Ladies and gentlemen, I would submit to you that there are only two things
in question in this trial. .. So the two issues you really get to decide is
whether the Defendant possessed that meth, and whether she knew or
should have known that what was in that baggie was methamphetarnine.
(12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.24, Ls.5-14 (emphasis added).)
The prosecutor thus argued an incorrect legal standard.

It is prosecutorial

misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in closing arguments. State v. Phillips,
144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ordered a
new trial in a similar case where the jury relied upon an erroneous "knew or should have
known" standard to establish the defendant's knowledge. See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho
237, 240-241 (1999).
In State v. Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in
giving jury instructions which stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of
possession of a controlled substance the State must prove that he "knew or should
have known" that the substance possessed was a controlled substance.

133 Idaho

237, 240-241 (1999). The Supreme Court held that this was error, as it allowed the jury
to convict the defendant using a negligence standard. Id. at 241. The Idaho Supreme
'

Court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded the case with instructions for a
new trial. Id. at 243.

There the Court was specifically discussing cases in which the defendant mistakenly
believed he was in possession of a different, but still illegal, controlled substance.
Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704. Such is not the case here.
1
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Here, the prosecutor's remarks asked the jury to apply the incorrect legal
standard to establish the element of knowledge and thereby lowered the State's burden
of proof. The jury was left with the impression that it could convict Ms. Gabel even if it
found that she did not realize there was a controlled substance inside the baggie, but
"should have known" what was in the baggie.
The prosecutorial misconduct in Ms. Gabel's case rises to the level of
fundamental error. The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate
review of unobjected-to error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Pursuant to
Perry, a defendant must demonstrate that:

1) one or more of his unwaived

constitutional rights were violated; 2) there was a clear and obvious error without the
need for additional information not contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning that there is a reasonable
probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.

Id. at 226.

Ms. Gabel meets all the prongs of this test.
First, the alleged error is a violation of Ms. Gabel's right to due process and a fair
trial.

Ms.

Gabel

was

charged

with

possession

of a controlled

substance,

methamphetamine. {R., pp.24-25.) The general elements instruction told the jury that
"[i]n order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, the
state must prove each of the following: . . . the defendant either knew it was
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance," (Jury Instruction No. 11,
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on December 19, 2014), but the prosecutor, in
her closing remarks, incorrectly told the jury that it was required to prove only that
Ms. Gabel "knew or should have known" that the baggie contained methamphetamine,
thus removing the State's burden to prove that Ms. Gabel actually knew it was
8

niethamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance (12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.24,
Ls.'i 3-14 ).

Because this misleading explanation of a key element of the crime was

given to the jury, Ms. Gabel's right to a fair trial and due process v1ere violated.
In In re l/1/inship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364 (emphasis added).

Thus,

when a defendant charged with a crime pleads not guilty and takes his or her case to
trial, the defendant is exercising his or her rights to due process of law and to a jury trial,
requiring the State to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged, to a
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt. See U.S. Const. amds V, VI, XIV; see also Winship,
397 U.S. at 364; Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978); Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993).
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law
as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including
reasonable inferences from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The prosecutor's statement
misinformed the jury as to the State's burden of proof as to Ms. Gabel's knowledge,
which was a violation of Ms. Gabel's right to due process.

See also State v. Beebe,

145 Idaho 570 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a
fundamental error where the prosecutor misstated the evidence, misstated the law, and
appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury).
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Thus the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find
Ms. Gabel guilty of possession of a controlled substance without finding that she knew
what was in the bag. Such an interpretation would have deprived Ms. Gabel of her right
to the due process of law and her right to a fair trial; thus, the erroneous explanation of
the elements in this case was unconstitutional.

Thus, the error implicates one of

Ms. Gabel's unwaived constitutional rights.
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. These fair trial and due
process violations are apparent from the face of the record and are clear violations of
well-established law. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478, 485-86 (1978); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 ('1993).

The

closing statements of the prosecutor are in the record, so there is no need for additional
information outside the record.

Further, there could be no strategic advantage to

defense counsel allowing the prosecutor to lower the State's burden of proof by
misleading the jury as to whether Ms. Gabel was required to know what was in the bag.
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. While the jury did receive an instruction properly setting forth the general
elements of possession of a controlled substance (Jury Instruction No. 11, attached to
the Motion to Augment filed on December 19, 2014; 12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.17, Ls.13-25),
the prosecutor misinformed the jury as to what knowledge Ms. Gabel must have to be
guilty of the offense.

( 12/11 /13 Trial Tr., p.24, Ls.11-14.) Because of the error, the jury

was left with the impression that it could convict Ms. Gabel even if it found that she did
not know what was in the bag. Further, the first trial, at which the prosecutor did not
give an erroneous elements explanation and which

resulted in a hung jury,

demonstrated that there had been question in the minds of the previous jury as to
10

whether Ms. Gabel was guilty of the offense. (11/13/13 Trial Tr., p.13, L.6- p.18, L.21,
p.34, L.14 - p.35, L.3.) Had this jury been properly instructed and not mislead by the
prosecutor's statements, it is likely this jury would have also been unable to convict
Ms. Gabel of the offense.
It was apparent from the prosecutor's misstatement of the law that the jury could
convict Ms. Gabel based on an improper standard of knowledge. Where the jury was
instructed that it could find Ms. Gabel guilty based on a negligence standard, this
removed the burden on the State to prove that Ms. Gabel knew or believed the
substance in question to be a controlled substance.
Because the prosecutor's explanation of the element of possession violated
Ms. Gabel's right to due process and a fair trial, and because she meets all three
prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Ms. Gabel's conviction must be vacated.
B.

It Was Misconduct For The Prosecutor To Offer Her Opinion Concerning
Ms. Gabel's Purported Lack Of Truthfulness And/Or Her Guilt Of The Charged
Offense
It was misconduct for the prosecution to give her opinion regarding Ms. Gabel's

veracity.

Such was an improper attempt to influence the jury using the weight of her

office which constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment states,
"[n]o state shall. .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution guarantees
that, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." ID. CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal trials be fundamentally fair.
11

Schwartzmil!er v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so

unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's
right to a fair trial.

Id.

The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

The aim of due process is not the

punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial
to the accused. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[e]very person accused of crime in
Idaho has the right to a fair and impartial trial." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504
(1980). Further, the prosecutor has an independent duty to the defendant with regard to
his or her right to a fair trial. In the words of the Court:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to
the jury." They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far
they can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing
they transgress upon the rights of the accused."
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal citations omitted). The Idaho

Court of Appeals has held:
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution
by the trier of fact in a criminal case. Its purpose is to enlighten the jury
and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. Both sides
have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument
to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369 (Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
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However, closing argument should not include the prosecutor's personal opinions
and beliefs about the credibility of a witness or inflammatory words employed in
describing the defendant. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86; see State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho
160, 169 (Ct. App. "1999) (holding that "it is improper for a prosecutor to express a

personal belief or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or
as to the guilt of the defendant"); see also State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, "111 (1979)
{holding that it was error for the prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion as to
the truth or falsity of the defendant's testimony, but in light of the overwhelming and
conclusive evidence against the defendant, the error was harmless). 2
With respect to due process, the United States Supreme Court has explained
why the prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness's credibility or express a personal
opinion of the defendant's guilt, stating:
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing
his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two
dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges
against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be
tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and
may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its
own view of the evidence.
Carson, 151 Idaho at 721 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)).
Here, the prosecutor asked the jury to make a decision based upon her opinion
that Ms. Gabel was untruthful. The prosecutor's statements went much further than the
permissible bounds allowed to encourage a jury to question the credibility of witnesses.

Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 provides, "A lawyer shall not ... in trial ... state
a personal opinion as to ... the credibility of a witness ... or the guilt or innocence of an
accused." The rule applies to both the prosecuting attorney and to defense counsel.
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721 (2011 ).
2
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The prosecutor told the jury that, in her opinion, Ms. Gabel had a motive to be
untruthful:
She tells the officer that she doesn't [know what was in the baggie]. She
says oh, what's that, what's that? So then we have to ask, was she being
truthful when she said oh, what's that? I don't know what it is. Would she
have a motive to not be truthful at that point? / think so.
(12/1 ·1/13 Trial Tr., p.25, L.22 - p.26, L2 (emphasis added).)

The prosecutor then

correctly told tl1e jury it was up to them to determine credibility, but immediately
thereafter again stated that she did not believe Ms. Gabel's version of the events:
Now, the defense is going to tell you that everything that she said after
that was a product of that untruth, that she was just mimicking the officer.
She was just saying what he said. And if she had said, yeah, you're right,
and left it at that, / could maybe buy that. But she didn't.
(12/11/13 Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.15-2·1 (emphasis added).)

Ms. Gabel asserts that the

prosecution made impermissible statements inserting her personal view of the
evidence, including repeatedly offering her opinion that Ms. Gabel was not telling the
truth.
It is a violation of Ms. Gabel's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial
to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial
and the law as explained in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to the
prosecution expressing opinions regarding Ms. Gabel's credibility interfered with the
jury's ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Ms. Gabel's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.

As such, the misconduct in this case clearly

violates her unwaived constitutional rights and deprived her of her right to a fair trial. As
such, this Court must vacate the conviction.
The prosecutorial misconduct violated Ms. Gabel's fundamental rights and meets
the test set forth in Perry, as discussed in section A. First, it is a violation of Ms. Gabel's
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have a jury reach its decision on
any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as explained in the jury
instructions.

It should be noted that the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry that,

"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition
by the Idaho Supreme Court that prosecutorial misconduct claims may be connected to
a constitutional provision.
The misconduct in this case not only involved Ms. Gabel's state and federal
constitutional rights to due process, but also her federal and state constitutional rights to
a jury trial.

As such, the errors involve an unwaived constitutional right and are

reviewable for fundamental error. The error in this case plainly exists from the record
and no additional information is necessary. The record in this case suggests no reason
to conclude that defense counsel elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to waive any
objection when the prosecution disparaged the veracity of Ms. Gabel. Further, it cannot
be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict, not
based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds presented through
misconduct. As such, the first two prongs of the Perry test are satisfied.
The final question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the
prosecutor's misconduct affected the outcome of Ms. Gabel's trial. Ms. Gabel contends
that there is. The prosecutor's comments on Ms. Gabel's veracity and thus her guilt or
innocence impermissibly usurped the jury's role as the factfinder and further, because
the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government, it may have
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induced the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence.

As such, the State's misconduct was extraordinarily prejudicial and,

therefore, satisfies the third prong of the Perry test.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Gabel respectfully requests that this Court vacate her Judgment of
Conviction and remand her case for a new trial.
DATED this 19 th day of December, 2014.

SALLY;J. COOLEY ·
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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